Abstract. This document describes an industrial application of the B method in smart card applications. In smart card memory, data modification may be interrupted due to a card withdrawal or a power loss. The EEPROM memory may result in an unstable state and the values subsequently read may be erroneous. The transaction mechanism provides a secure means for modifying data located in the EEPROM. As the security in smart card applications is paramount, the use of the B formal method brings high confidence and provides mathematical proof that the design of the transaction mechanism fulfills the security requirements.
Introduction
The EEPROM memory is used for permanently storing data in smart cards. In normal operation mode, when the card is pulled out of the terminal or the power is turned off, the information stored in the EEPROM is preserved.
Due to its electronic characterization and to its physical constraints, a modification of data is not performed in a single and atomic operation. Instead, this process may take up to a few milliseconds. This lapse of time is required for electronically charging the memory cells and reaching a steady state that enables permanent retention of the information. If the power is turned off, or the card is unexpectedly pulled out while a memory cell is being written, the electronic charge may not be sufficient for retaining the information in a durable way. Values obtained from subsequent accesses to the memory may be non-deterministic.
The transaction is a software mechanism that prevents errors from these misuses; it enables modification of data in a secure way: the data are all correctly modified or their values are left unchanged.
This insures coherence among data simultaneously modified within a transaction.
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First overview of the transaction mechanism
The transaction mechanism provides a means to update several data in an "atomic" way. This feature is of great importance to keep the coherence among data which are simultaneously modified.
Within a transaction, it is required that every data value is either correctly modified or left unchanged: if a card withdrawal occurs while a transaction is activated, the system shall preserve each data initial value.
In the example depicted below, the modification of data shall change the state of the memory from "State0" to "State1" in the absence of errors.
In case of an uncompleted modification process, the memory may be changed to an unwanted state "State2". Then, the transaction shall restore the initial state "State0".
Fig. 1. Overall transaction mechanism
The backup level Prior to any modification or update, the data must be copied (duplicated) in a special location of the EEPROM called the "backup zone". The process of copying the data in the backup zone is performed by the backup mechanism. It may be interrupted if the card is withdrawn or if the power is turned off. Once the copy is performed, data values can be modified freely, without risking a card pullout.
If several data are modified within a transaction, their copies are piled-up in the backup zone. In case of a card pullout, their values shall be restored by the system by the "rollback" process at the next card insertion.
Once a transaction is terminated, and if no error has occurred, the data stored in the backup zone are discarded. This is performed by the "commit" process.
Then, for security reasons, the backup zone shall be cleared. 
Unsuccessful modification

Successful modification
Fig. 2. Transaction and backup mechanisms
The above figure illustrates the use of the backup mechanism in a transaction:
• The data "State0" are first duplicated in the memory, • The successful data modifications change the subset of memory "State0" to "State1"; the duplicated data then become useless, and they shall be discarded.
• Conversely, in case of a modification failure ("State2" is obtained instead of "State1"), the duplicated data are restored to retrieve the original state of the memory ("State0").
The transaction mechanism
In this section we provide a complete overview of the transaction mechanism using a fictitious example. This is intended to help the reader understand how this mechanism works; we also explain the informal reasoning leading to the conviction that this mechanism provides total protection against certain security flaws. In the next part of this article, such informal reasoning will no longer be considered satisfactory, and the B method will be used to create a formal and proven reasoning.
Suppose for instance that a smart card is used in a cellular phone. The information stored in EEPROM could include the communication login records, with the duration, charges, etc.. Someone could try to stop every communication by withdrawing the smart card instead of hanging up, thus trying to introduce an error in the EEPROM communication record that would disturb the charging system. Potential benefits would range from the impossibility of charging the last communication to a complete disabling of the charging system (free calls).
The overall charging system could for instance be organized in the following way: when a phone call is started, an initial null fee is recorded in the EEPROM permanent memory. While the communication is engaged, the smart card regularly accesses its EEPROM to increase the fee. The final fee is then recorded when the communication is finished.
Without a transaction mechanism, a card withdrawal or a power loss while the EEPROM is being written, would cause random value updates, and potential damages of the surrounding data cells. Using a transaction mechanism, when a group of EEPROM data cells is about to be changed, their previous values and addresses are stored in a special backup zone in the EEPROM by the transaction mechanism. If a card withdrawal occurs while the communication fee is updated, the previous fee is retrieved.
One could also ask what will happen if the withdrawal occurred while backing up the previous values; would it be possible that some incorrect values induced in the backup zone by a card withdrawal could be mistakenly "restored", thus replacing the yet unchanged data values?
To avoid this kind of pitfall, each group of backed up values is ended by a checksum value, which, we assume, will always be incorrect if the backup action is violently interrupted. The next time the power is turned on, the smart card software simply discards the last backed up data if its checksum is incorrect. No restoring would be required for these data, because if the checksum is incorrect, it is implied that the backup has been interrupted, and thus, no data update has been performed yet. When a whole transaction is completed, the backup zone must be cleared. Of course, this must also be done in a safe way...
The informal reasoning that we use in this paragraph gives a rational that our transaction mechanism indeed forbids any inconsistent data but it does not bring confidence in the reasoning. Instead, the complete B formal argument we describe later, starts from the assumption that "data should be either modified as scheduled or left unchanged" and leads to the detailed algorithm in a fully proven way. Thus, we will be sure that this algorithm with all its complexity (data format in the backup zone, pointer management to read or clear the backup zone, etc.) fulfills its requirements.
Functional requirements and security properties
The use of formal methods in industrial applications requires identifying, stating and clarifying the functional and security requirements together with the environment assumptions. This task may involve re-expressing the requirements in an informal text (French, English, etc.). This task is preliminary to the formalization step. Many omissions and inconsistencies may be found at this early stage in the process.
For the sake of conciseness, only the most important requirements of the transaction mechanism are listed below. Each requirement is labeled to facilitate the traceability of the formal representation.
Functional requirements
FUN1
The transaction mechanism shall insure that a modification of data in the EEPROM is always performed in a safe way: the data is either correctly modified or its value is left unchanged.
FUN2
At any time in the transaction process, the card may be withdrawn or the power may be turned off.
FUN3
At any time, the application may abort a transaction. The state of the memory shall be brought back to its original state.
FUN4
Nested transactions are not supported: a transaction must be terminated before a new one is started.
Security requirements
SEC1
To avoid risk of data disclosure, the transaction mechanism shall not permanently retain information, and the backup zone shall be cleared after use.
SEC2
The transaction mechanism shall be resistant to card pullout.
Environment assumptions
ENV1
The backup mechanism must not rely on any specific hardware device or on chip features. It must be generic enough to be implemented on any type of component.
ENV2
Any unpredictable memory behavior due to defective aging cells and over-stressed modifications is out of the scope of the backup mechanism.
The formal modeling
The formal modeling technique that we use for our application does not consist of directly constructing the software algorithm. Instead, we shall obtain it in a rigorous way, from the main requirements using the refinement mechanism. We consider that the system dynamics are expressed through asynchronous events.
Each event is characterized by two components:
• a trigger that we call "guard", specifying some (but not all) necessary conditions for the event to occur, • the action which modifies the global data of the system when the guard is valid.
The development is made in several refinements: each step must refine its preceding level. The transition to the next level is characterized by a transformation of the state abstract data to more concrete data and by the refinement of the events.
The events in refinements can be obtained in several ways: 1. A concrete event directly refines its abstract counterpart (with possible strengthening of the guard and translation of the action section to take the new data space into account), 2. An abstract event is split into several concrete refining events. Combined together, the new concrete events shall refine the abstract one. 3. Addition of new concrete events which do not have abstract counterparts. However, the new concrete events must refine the abstract virtual event "skip". Usually, the model development begins with an abstract model featuring very few events. At the beginning of the model development, we attempt to add events using modalities (2) and (3).
These events provide an implementation of the algorithm.
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As a card pullout may occur at any time during the transaction process, it appears very suitable and effective to represent the system by events.
The refinement principle presented above will be explained in more detail in the following paragraphs, when we present each refinement step of the actual B model for the transaction mechanism (particularly at the first refinement step).
The mathematical assumptions which must be true for one B model to be a correct refinement of another are completely defined in the B theory (as stated in the B-Book [1] ). The scope of this article is to show how the main requirements are expressed in B and how the refinement technique is gradually introduced until we obtain an implementable algorithm.
The abstract model Scope
The abstract model provides a high level representation of the functional requirements and the security properties. It states in a non-ambiguous way the main requirements that must be fulfilled throughout the software development life cycle.
The scope of the formal model is to provide a comprehensive representation of one transaction. In our model, the time slice is a complete transaction. Thus it can be either:
• A transaction initiated by the card application software, and normally terminated by the software; • A transaction initiated by the card application software, but interrupted by a card withdrawal before the commit action. When the card is reinserted, the system restores its original data (rollback process) before terminating the transaction.
• A transaction interrupted as in the previous case, but with a rollback process interrupted once or many times before being able to complete the transaction.
• A transaction interrupted after the commit action, during the clearing of the backup zone. When the card is reinserted, the transaction terminates by completing the clearing. Such a transaction shall have a very simple requirement: the data shall be either correctly updated or left unchanged. This requirement FUN1 will be the top-level requirement, as it is considered as the most important one.
Should this model be used in a more complex application, the whole transaction process can be re-started several times, but its validity and robustness are demonstrated once.
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Variables / Invariants
The following section introduces the main entities which are used in the abstract machine model:
The function "Memory0" represents the EEPROM memory of the smart card. It is a total function from the set of addresses to the set of values (at this stage of the formal representation, we do not take into consideration whether a memory element is a byte, a short integer, etc.).
Memory0 £ DATAZONE ± DATUM The partial function "NewState0" identifies the subset of elements to be overridden in the memory during the transaction. The variable "NewState0" denotes the final status of the transaction system. It is an abstract representation of the anticipated EEPROM memory state when the transaction is terminated. The "NewState0" variable is only used for formally identifying the expected final memory status, and for formally demonstrating that it will be reached by the system. The variable "NewState0" is an abstract variable called a "prophecy variable":
Events
The first event that we use in our model is the event "Transaction". It is defined as the termination of the single and complete transaction process, which can include, as stated before, one or several withdrawals and re-insertions. Therefore, the property that is stated in the "Transaction" event is nothing else than the main requirement of the transaction system:
• the total function "Memory0" is correctly updated by the partial function "NewState0", or • the function "Memory0" is left unchanged ("skip" statement).
This requirement (FUN1) can be written in B using the "Choice" statement: 
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The complete abstract machine
In the abstract machine above, the "context" machine contains the definition of DATUM and DATAZONE; this allows the concrete definition of these parameters to be postponed until we reach the final implementation.
Explaining the refinement principle
Now that we have stated the functional requirement FUN1 in a formalized way, we can explain precisely how the B method is used to prove that an algorithm indeed fulfills this requirement.
Suppose for instance that instead of the real transaction mechanism, we use a simplified algorithm. In this algorithm, we modify only one data cell with the following steps:
1. Saving the data cell in the backup zone 2. Modifying the first half of the data cell 3. Modifying the second half of the data cell 4. Committing (clearing the backup zone).
We also suppose that a card withdrawal can occur only between these steps. Thus if the card has been withdrawn, the data cell is either unmodified, half modified, completely modified. Card withdrawal is detected from a non-empty backup zone at power up. Then the rollback process, copies back the backup zone into the data cell. These hypotheses are really unrealistic as no actual hardware can guarantee them, but the transaction mechanism becomes so simple that it will be possible to write it as the first refinement of our abstract machine.
Variables
To express this concrete simplified algorithm, we need:
• A variable denoting the data zone as before (we rename Memory0 in Memory1 to denote that Memory1 is the actual concrete data zone)
• A variable denoting the fist part of the modification
• A variable denoting the second part of the modification
• And, of course, a variable representing the backup zone
• We also need a variable to represent the control flow of the program. The sequence of occurring events is not preserved when splitting an algorithm into B events. To keep this information, we must use a control flow variable, usually called "state".
State1 £ {init, backedup, mod1, mod2, committed, end, rolledback, withdrawn} The abstract variable NewState0 disappears, as it does not represent any actual memory cell.
Events
Now, we can define as B events each step of our algorithm:
The backup step:
This event can only occur in phase init. The data zone is copied to the backup zone.
The first modification step:
This event can only occur after the first backup. The data zone is modified by
The second modification step:
This event is similar to the previous one, by replacing FirstHalf1 by SecondHalf1 and by changing the phase to mod2.
The commit step
This step can only occur after the second modification. The backup zone is cleared.
The withdrawal event
Withdrawal can occur at any time. Our previous hypotheses that this event cannot interrupt a modification or rollback step is implicitly modeled as each of these steps is represented as a single B event. Therefore a card withdrawal can only occur between these steps. In a B description, B events only occur one at a time.
The rollback event
The rollback event is to occur only after the card has been withdrawn. The backup zone is restored in the data zone.
The transaction event
The transaction event represents the fact that we consider the transaction terminated as soon as a commit or rollback action has taken place. In the real world, the transaction event is considered to occur just after a rollback or commit, with no delay. As this event already exists in the abstract machine, we have to prove that its definition here is a correct refinement of its abstract counterpart.
Central gluing invariant
For the proof to be consistent, we must state the links between this refined model and our abstract specification. The crucial one is the link between the abstract and the refined view of the data zone:
This assumption indicates that the data zone described in the abstract machine represents the state of the actual data zone excepted during a transaction. If we forget or make a mistake in this gluing invariant, the proof will be irrelevant. To stress the importance of this "gluing invariant", let's imagine some mistakes :
♦ If the link is simply expressed as "Memory0 = Memory1", the modification of Memory1 in two parts is not possible without breaking the link, then causing a proof error. ♦ If no link exists between Memory0 and Memory1, then Memory1 does not represent anything in relation with Memory0, and there is nothing to prove. Therefore these "gluing invariants" are of great importance: a mistake in these links usually leads to a proof error, but completely forgetting them leads to no proof at all. In this case, the abstract model does not put any constraint on the concrete level. The B language allows the use of arbitrary abstract variables in abstracts levels, enabling the expression of requirements in a simple way; this implies the correct linking of these abstract variables to reality.
The second very important link is the link to the "prophecy variable" NewState0:
The concrete link for the prophecy variable is quite simple here, because in this fancy example we suppose that we know in advance the modifications to be performed in the data zone.
Derived gluing invariant
With the two previous gluing invariants, one could guess how the refinement proof is defined: the transaction operation should not break these links. From now on, Security is ensured: whatever we write in addition to these two links, either the refined mechanism fulfills the FUN1 requirement, or it is impossible to prove this refinement in accordance with the B theory.
However, we must notice that the two previous links are not sufficient to allow the proof of this refinement. A set of invariants must be added to provide a sufficient knowledge in the final state "end" and to prove that the two major links hold. What is important to understand is that whatever this set of invariants is, if we find one that matches, then the algorithm is necessary correct. In particular, if we introduce an error in the previous algorithm (for example, we could suppose that the "backup" event might be incorrectly repeated after the first modification step), then finding such a set of invariants becomes impossible.
Local conclusion
With the study of this example, we have explained the principle used in this B development. Of course, it is impossible to reach the actual transaction mechanism in one refinement step; in fact we use 11 refinements levels. At each level, we check only that the two major links are correctly defined, and we add what is necessary to terminate the proof. If the final algorithm reached is feasible using smart card hardware, then we have proved that the card will actually fulfill requirement FUN1 (provided, of course, that the B theory is correct, that our software tool applies it correctly, and that our prover performs correct proofs). Now we can resume the real development.
The first refinement Scope
In this refinement, the transaction mechanism is performed in several successive steps; each modeled on an event. We introduce the backup zone for storing copies of the data which are modified in the transaction. It is assumed that the backup zone is empty before starting the transaction and it must be demonstrated that it is also empty when the transaction is finished (aborted or normally terminated).
The modeling technique enables refinement of the abstract model by "zooming" in the event "Transaction". This process is also elicited as "time stretching"; it allows the introduction of the events "BeginTransaction", "Modify", "Rollback", "Pullout" and "AbortTransaction". The transaction mechanism can be represented as a state machine (see above).
Variables and Invariants
In this section, we introduce the major variables and entities of the refinement model:
The variables "NewState1" and "Memory1" are identical to the abstract level.
The variable "CardState1" represents the state of the transaction mechanism:
CardState1 £ {START, BACKUP, MODIFIED, WITHDRAWN, INIROLLBACK,ROLLBACK, STOP} The variable "BackMemory1" is a partial function which indicates the data which are duplicated in the backup zone:
BackMemory1 £ DATAZONE ² DATUM Before starting a transaction, it is assumed that the backup zone is cleared and when a transaction is terminated, the backup zone must also be cleared:
The variable "MemoryInit1" is an abstract variable, which indicates the state of the memory, before the transaction is started. It can be considered as a snapshot of the memory just before the transaction is started:
MemoryInit1 £ DATAZONE ± DATUM At any time, except at the end of a transaction, the initial state of the memory "MemoryInit1" can be restored using the backup data "BackMemory1". When the transaction is terminated, the backup zone is cleared (BackMemory1=Ç); it is then impossible to retrieve "MemoryInit1" from "Memory1":
From the above expressions (1) and (2), it can be deduced that "MemoryInit1" equals "Memory1" when the transaction is started:
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The process of modifying the data is considered complete when the EEPROM memory at the beginning of the transaction "MemoryInit", has been overridden by the data "NewState1":
Events
A transaction is initiated by the event "BeginTransaction" and it can only be triggered when the system state is "START". This operation is an abstract operation; its only purpose is to switch the system state from "START" to "BACKUP".
The event "Modify" is an abstract event which indicates that the modifications have been performed and the memory is completely updated. The way the modifications have been realized is not described at this level of the formalization:
The event "AbortTransaction" may be triggered by the application at any time before or after the modification of data is performed (CardState1£{BACKUP,MODIFIED}). This corresponds to a willful action of the programmer, and the memory must be changed back to its original state (i.e., before the transaction was started). Then the system must start the restore/rollback process:
The event "Rollback" restores the initial state of the memory by overriding "Memory1" with the backed up data "BackMemory1":
The "Pullout" event is an abstract description of a physical and mechanical phenomenon. Its only goal is to make sure that the card pullout event does not break the invariant statements of the backup mechanism. It will not be implemented, and it is not part of the backup algorithm.
The security requirements of the transaction mechanism are thus fulfilled by demonstrating that the "Pullout" event does not hamper the backup process. The backup mechanism is then formally proven to be resistant to card withdrawals that may occur at any time.
At this level of the refinement process, the "Pullout" event indicates only that the transaction system must proceed with rolling back the data located in the backup zone. This is indicated by switching the state variable CardState1 to "WITHDRAWN: the only possible event to be elected now becomes "ROLLBACK":
The "Transaction" event has been refined by several new events as previously described. It now consists only in erasing the backup data "BackMemory1" and switching the state variable " CardState1" to STOP:
The second refinement Scope
In the first refinement, the data modification was performed in a single event called "Modify".
In reality, a transaction may be performed by several partial data modifications. The goal of this refinement is to introduce two new events "BuffModify" and "BuffBackup" which represent iterative buffer modifications.
The transaction is complete when all partial buffer modifications have been performed correctly as described in the abstract model.
The action performed by the abstract specification of the "Modify" event, is now replaced by an undefined number of iterations of the events "BuffBackup" and "BuffModify".
The card is likely to be withdrawn at any time, and in particular before or after the events "BuffBackup" and "BuffModify". This implies that the "Pullout" event may be triggered at any time during the transaction. 
Variables and Invariants
The variables "NewState2", "Memory2", "MemoryInit2", "BackMemory2" are identical to their counterparts in the previous level.
The value "BUFFBACKUP" is added to the possible states of "CardState2":
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CardState2 £ {START, BACKUP, MODIFIED, WITHDRAWN, INIROLLBACK, ROLLBACK, STOP, BUFFBACKUP} The Variable "NewMemory2" is a function representing a buffer which is updated at each iteration of the sequence defined by the event "BuffBackup" followed by "BuffModify":
Events
The event "BuffBackup" updates the buffer "NewMemory2". At this level of the abstract model, no particular constraint is imposed on the buffer: it can be of any size and may take any value represented by the partial function "l_new_memory".
The expression "BackMemory2" shown below indicates that the subset of memory to be overridden by "NewMemory2" is entirely backed up in the backup zone.
If an element is backed up several times, the backup zone only needs to store its oldest values. This requirement is of great importance to be able to retrieve the original state of the memory. It is expressed by the expression:
The sequencing of the events "BuffBackup" and "BuffModify", is imposed by their guards; it ensures that the memory buffer is backed up before being modified by "NewMemory2".
The expression of "BuffModify" is straightforward as the modification of the memory is performed by overriding "Memory2" by the buffer "NewMemory2":
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Remark 2. In the above expression,"CardState2" is changed to "BACKUP". This implies that, in absence of card withdrawal, the only eligible future events will be "BuffBackup" or "Modify" (see above and after).
The event "Modify" is now refined by an abstract event. Its guard provides the conditions of termination of the memory modification Memory2 = MemoryInit2 ½ NewState2:
The model does not provide any evidence that the sequence of events "BuffBackup" and "BuffModify" will terminate and that the final state described by "NewState2" is reached.
Instead, the model only indicates that for a transaction to terminate, the complete set of modifications defined by "NewState2" shall be performed by several buffer modifications.
It is the application's responsibility to demonstrate that the transaction events are correctly used, and that the memory modifications predicted by the abstract variable "NewState" are indeed realized.
The 3 rd refinement Scope
The 3 rd refinement describes the High Level design of the transaction system: the backup zone is now described as a stack.
For the sake of simplicity, if it is required to back up a data value several times within a transaction, it is duplicated in the backup zone and piled up in the stack: the system does not perform any checks to reduce the amount of duplicated data.
Similarly, the rollback mechanism consists in restoring the backed up buffers in the reverse order to ensure that their oldest values are restored in the memory.
Variables and invariants
The backup zone is described as a stack and the buffers are piled-up and numbered using increasing numbers. The variable "Top3" represents the number of backed up buffers:
Top3 £ NATURAL The variable "SavedBuff3" is a function which associates each buffer with its corresponding number. A buffer is described as a subset of the memory (a partial function from "DATAZONE" to "DATUM") :
The variable "Add3" identifies the set of all backed up elements. It is an abstract variable. It is used as an intermediate variable to facilitate and simplify the predicate expressions of the invariants:
The variable "Mark3" indicates for each backed up element belonging to "Add3", the corresponding buffer number of its first occurrence in the backup zone:
Mark3" is an abstract variable which is used for gluing the variable "BackMemory2" as defined in the previous level to the variable "SavedBuff3". The following statement indicates that the backed up data identified by "BackMemory2" are also marked in the backup zone by the "Mark3" variable. In case of a rollback, these values shall be restored in the memory:
The following figure represents the entities listed above. In this example, the element "el1" is backed up twice (in the buffers n°2 and n°3 respectively). The function "Mark3" indicates that the first occurrence of the element "el1" in the backup zone is in the buffer n°2. The variable "Top3" is equal to 3: 
Event
The events defined in this refinement have similar meanings to those of the previous level but their expressions are modified to take into account the new variables defined above. The BuffBackup event illustrates these changes:
• the function "NewMemory3" is updated by some partial function "l_new_memory" and the variable "CardState3" is switched to "BUFFBACKUP", • the buffer of data (dom(l_new_memory)» Memory3) which will be modified by "NewMemory3" is appended to the backup zone stack "SavedBuff3". Its index is set to "Top3+1". The global expression is: SavedBuff3 := SavedBuff3ª {Top3+1¯(dom(l_new_memory)» Memory3)}. The 4 th refinement is used for technical and simplification purposes. In the 3 rd refinement, several abstract variables were introduced for gluing the variables to those of the 2 nd level. These variables are no longer required in the 4 th refinement ("Mark3" and "Add3") and are simply removed.
The formal expression of the invariant clause and of the events is identical to the previous model, purged of the predicates and the useless variables.
Variables and invariants
The variables at the 4 th refinement are all identical to the variables of the 3 rd refinements, except for "Mark3" and "Add3" which are simply removed. They are labeled "CardState4", "NewMemory4" and the gluing is straightforward:
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Proof
As the refinement consists of a simplification of the previous model, the resulting proof obligations are either obvious or automatically demonstrated by the prover (in the tool we use, the "obvious" proof obligations are the ones eliminated by a basic prover included in the proof obligation generator, for instance when the goal in literally found in the hypotheses)..
The 5 th refinement Scope
The 5 th refinement consists of modeling the modification and the constraints on the global variables resulting from a card pullout.
As a card pullout may occur at any time during the backup process, it may seem necessary for each event to model its counterpart when the card is withdrawn.
However, a card withdrawal may alter the transaction mechanism only when the backup memory or the data memory are modified. An erroneous modification in the backup zone might prevent the system from being able to restore the initial state of the memory. Similarly, an erroneous modification of the memory may cause the system not to reach its final expected condition.
As a consequence, two new events are introduced to provide a formal expression of the card withdrawal during the processes of backing up and buffer modification: "BuffBackupPullout" and "BuffModifyPullout".
The demonstration of the proof obligation generated by these new events provide evidence that the global invariants of the transaction system are not broken by the "Pullout" events.
They are introduced in the model in place of the "Pullout" event when the system state is either "BACKUP" or "BUFFBACKUP". The guard of "Pullout" is then simply restricted (or strengthened).
When the card is plugged back in the terminal after a pullout, it is assumed that:
• only the last buffer of the backup zone may be erroneous (the only case where the last buffer may be erroneous is when the card has been pulled-out while the backup was in progress), • all buffers but the last one are necessarily correct.
As a consequence, all valid buffers in the backup zone must be rolled back after a card pullout.
At this level of abstraction, it is assumed that:
• the last buffer is considered invalid if the card is withdrawn while the backup is in progress (the other buffers are all valid), • all buffers in the backup zone are valid if the card is withdrawn at any other time.
Variables and invariants
The variable "LstBufVal5" is a simple Boolean value which indicates the last buffer validity:
LstBufVal5 £ BOOL All variables except "Top5" and "SavedBuff5", are identical to the 4 th refinement and are labeled "CardState5", "NewMemory5" etc...
In normal operating mode (no card pull-out), the variables "Top5" and "SavedBuff5" are identical to their counterparts in the previous refinement, and the last buffer is assumed to be correct. This is stated as follows:
If a card pullout occurs while the backup is in progress, the last buffer is declared erroneous (LstBufVal5 = FALSE). It comes out that all buffers of the backup zone except the last one, match the previous refinement (1ÏTop4)»SavedBuff5=SavedBuff4. The last erroneous buffer is simply added on top of the backup stack (Top5=Top4+1). This is expressed as :
Events
The event "BuffBackupPullout" is similar to its counterpart "BuffBackup" except that the stack "SavedBuffer5" is updated by a buffer "l_back" which is not related to "NewMemory5": SavedBuff5:=SavedBuff5ª{Top5+1¯l_back}.
The Boolean "LstBufVal5" is set FALSE:
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CardState5 := BUFFBACKUP Ø SavedBuff5:=SavedBuff5ª{Top5+1¯l_back} Ø Top5 := Top5+1 Ø LstBufVal5 := FALSE END END Similarly, the event "BuffModifyPullout" is identical to the event "BuffModify" except that the buffer which is appended to the memory is not equal to "NewMemory5" (it can be of any type).
Proofs
The demonstration of the proof obligations provides evidence that the events "BuffBackupPullout" and "BuffModifyPullout" fulfill the invariant predicates. They must preserve the following statements:
• all buffers of the backup zone except the last one are identical to the previous refinement, • the last buffer is erroneous if the card is pulled-out while the backup is in progress; it shall not be restored by the rollback process.
The 6 th refinement
The 6 th refinement is used for technical and simplification purposes. Certain variables introduced in the previous levels were only useful for proof purposes. Those variables do not interfere with the algorithm, they are used to memorize information to be able to prove. Now that it has been established that the 5 th refinement is correct, we can get rid of those variables. The 6 th refinement is identical to the 5 th one, minus those variables. This kind of refinement level is sometime called a "cut level".
The 7 th refinement
The 7 th refinement provides an implementation of the backup zone. Each buffer of the backup zone consists of a header and a set of values. The header provides the necessary information for restoring number of data values in the memory: the start address of the buffer zone and the length (number of data) of the buffer.
A supplementary checksum is added to the header. It is assumed that the checksum is able to determine in a non-ambiguous way the validity of the buffer.
The details of the computation of the checksum are out of the scope of this article. The formal representation only states that the validity of the last buffer determined by the variable "LstBuffVal5" (see 5 th refinement) can be substituted by the computation of a checksum value. Nevertheless, we must notice that the checksum calculation must prevent misinterpretation caused by simultaneous errors occurring together in the buffer data and in the checksum. The checksum mechanism also guarantees the correct identification of the card state, in particular it guarantees that a card withdrawal will always be detected at the next power up. The last three refinements of the development provide the complete algorithm of the transaction system. Several pointers are introduced for managing the backup and the rollback processes.
For the sake of efficiency, these pointers are located in the RAM memory. This implies that their values are lost when the card is pulled out. This is modeled by erasing their values in the pullout events (setting their values to zero for example). The formal model provides evidence that the algorithm is resistant to card pull-out, and the pointer values can be retrieved by a well designed scanning of the backup zone, and by analyzing the header structures: checksum, size of the buffer data etc.
The last refinement / the implementation level
The last refinement is called the implementation. It provides the complete backup algorithm and is translated into C language.
The process of code generation needs to transform an event-based architecture into a sequential program which can be run by a smart card processor. This can be obtained by first transforming the SELECT statements of the events into a PRE statement; the events must now be considered as pre-conditioned operations.
The sequencing of these operations is performed by a "scheduler" which is responsible for calling the operations in a way that complies with the pre-conditions. The scheduler is defined in a separate B machine, and it is verified by the demonstration of the proof obligations.
The non deterministic SELECT clauses are forbidden in a B implementation. The transformation of the SELECT clauses into PRE statements must be done in a specific B abstract machine. This must be performed manually or by a script command; the traceability between the original model and the transformed one can be easily demonstrated. However, no proof obligation can be generated during this process.
Code generation
The design of the transaction mechanism using the B formal method has been carried out in parallel with a traditional design in C language.
The generation of the source code from the B model has been performed manually and its effectiveness in terms of code size, memory and stack is strictly comparable to the traditional design:
• The same number of variables and pointers on the backup stack has been used in both designs,
• In order to match the code size of the original design, some optimizations have been required for translating the event based model: all operations of the transaction model have been in-lined in the "scheduler" calls to reduce the processor stack and improve the execution speed.
Conclusion
The use of the B method for the design of the transaction mechanism has been greatly beneficial for the following reasons:
• formal description of the functional and security requirements, together with the environment assumptions, • formal validation of the detailed design and the pseudo-code algorithm, • reduction of the validation task load, • 100% of the proof obligations of the project (over 1500 in total) have been demonstrated in interactive mode with no added lemmas.
The transcription of C source code from the implementation level has been performed manually as no automatic translator is available for smart Card applications.
The results in terms of code size, memory and stack is comparable to the original design.
The design of an automatic translator is one of our concerns:
• It shall be able to generate source code which is compact enough to be used in the smart card applications,
• It must be flexible enough to meet the peculiarities of compilers and chips which are used in the industry,
• It should also take into account the programming recommendation to improve the security of the design against hardware failures.
We believe that these goals can be reached. The compactness of the code may be achieved in a completely safe way by including in the last stages of the B development all the size optimization tricks. The flexibility and the accordance to programming style guides may be achieved in the same way. The automatic translator would then be a very simple and literal one, potentially defined and proved using B.
The transaction mechanism has been successfully proved up to the detailed pseudocode algorithm in a fairly simple and affordable way. Such B developments may be used to gain extra safety of many critical parts while reducing the validation costs.
